G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to RP-US extradition treaty and Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country" which was founded upon the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of provisions of the United States Code.

Private respondent addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.

In response to private respondent, petitioner, denied the foregoing requests.

Respondent then claims his procedural right to due notice and hearing of his case which is indispensable of the right to due process.

ISSUE: Whethet or not private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between the due process clause in the Constitution and the RP-US Extradition Treaty?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent.

Categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

These two components law of the land, international law and municipal or national law, are not pitted against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by PD No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right.

The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.

G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983

JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), petitioner,
vs.
RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally."

Respondent Mayor denied such permit. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." To be more specific, reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend."

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Mayor of denying the permit is valid?

HELD:

Supreme Court ruled that denying the permit to rally by the Mayor was not valid.

Supreme Court concluded that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly.

There is a novel aspect to this case, If the rally were confined to Luneta, no question, as noted, would have arisen. So, too, if the march would end at another park. As previously mentioned though, there would be a short program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of the United States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. It was concurred in by the then Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of ratification was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15. As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of the Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. " The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. ..." To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be applicable, that question the confronts this Court.

Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it finds support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification and observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.

FACTS:

The Petitioner was an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229- an order which was issued by President Marcos as a measure to lessen the fatal or serious accidents in land transportation because of the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence- as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,".

He questioned the validity of a letter of Instruction providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. He contended that the Letter of Instruction is infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public and unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society as being compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter of Instructions No. 229 is valid?

HELD:

Supreme Court considered the petition far from meritorious and must be dismissed.

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued as a valid exercise of the police power.

The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed."

The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

It is not oppressive and confiscatory because what is only required is a rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source.

G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.

FACTS:

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" comes before this Court seeking to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.


He alleged that Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, issued by the President, to be illgal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is valid.


HELD:

Supreme Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that:

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.

It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory, thus Military Commission has Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention.

G.R. No. L-2855 July 30, 1949

BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. He was handed by the government and later on ordered his release. But it was found out that he had entered the Philippines illegally without inspection and admission by the immigration officials thus ordered his deportation on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then detained while arrangements for his deportation are being made. Thereafter two boats of Russian nationality arrived but their masters refused to take petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not too long detention of the petitioner was valid?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioner.

Under section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 any alien who enters this country "without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated point of entry" is subject to deportation within five years. In a recent decision of a similar litigation (Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration) we denied the request for habeas corpus, saying:

"It must be admitted that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable lenght of time. However, under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

"The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transfortation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this petitioner. On the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since the last time he was apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to send him abroad. And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation or unless the Government admits that it can not deport him or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not interfere.

Separate Opinion

"To continue keeping petitioner under confinement is a thing that shocks conscience. Under the circumstances, petitioner is entitled to be released from confinement. He has not been convicted for any offense for which he may be imprisoned. Government's inability to deport him no pretext to keep him imprisoned for an indefinite length of time. The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law has been intended to protect all inhabitants or residents who may happen to be under the shadows of Philippine flag. Our vote is to grant the petition and to order the immediate release of petitioner, without prejudice for the government to deport him as soon as the government could have the means to do so. In the meantime, petitioner is entitled to live a normal life in a peaceful country, ruled by the principles of law and justice." (Perfecto, J.)