CASE DIGEST

Pimentel vs. Office of the Executive Secretary

July 6, 2005

FACTS:

This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute

The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states

Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents — the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs — to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.

It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.

Respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

ISSUE:

Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.

HELD:

SC rule in the negative.

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:

Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate, to make treaties xxx.

Section 14 (1) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution stated:
Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa.

The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth.

In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate.

SC disagree.

Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them.

x x x

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.

Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to render it effective.

20 salient points of International Criminal Court

1. Permanent judicial body established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998).

2. The ICC was established as a court of last resort to prosecute the most heinous offenses in cases where national courts fail to act.

3. Prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression- with certain condition.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court refers to the crime of aggression as one of the “most serious crimes of concern to the international community”, and provides that the crime falls within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the Rome Statute stipulates that the ICC may not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until such time as the states parties agree on a definition of the crime and set out the conditions under which it may be prosecuted.

Aggression has been included as a crime within the Court's jurisdiction. But first, the States Parties must adopt an agreement setting out two things: a definition of aggression, which has so far proven difficult, and the conditions under which the Court could exercise its jurisdiction. Several proposals have been considered. Some countries feel that, in line with the UN Charter and the mandate it gives to the Security Council, only the Council has the authority to find that an act of aggression has occurred. If this is agreed, then such a finding by the Council would be required before the Court itself could take any action. Other countries feel that such authority should not be limited to the Security Council. There are proposals under consideration that would give that role to the General Assembly or to the International Court of Justice, if an accusation of aggression were made and the Security Council did not act within a certain time. In September 2002, the Assembly of States Parties to the Court established a special working group, open to all States, to elaborate proposals for a provision on aggression.

4. The Court's Jurisdiction

The entire premise of the Court is based on the principle of complementarity, which means that the Court can only exercise its jurisdiction only when national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute such crimes. Primary responsibility to investigate and punish crimes is therefore left to individual states. The first priority always goes to national courts. The International Criminal Court is in no way meant to replace the authority of national courts. But there may be times when a State's court system collapses and ceases to function. Similarly, there may be governments that condone or participate in an atrocity themselves, or officials may be reluctant to prosecute someone in a position of great power and authority.

5. Conditions are required for the Court to act.

one or more of the parties involved is a State Party;

the accused is a national of a State Party;

the crime is committed on the territory of a State Party;

or a State not party to the Statute may decide to accept the court's jurisdiction over a specific crime that has been committed within its territory, or by its national.

But these conditions do not apply when the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, refers a situation to the Prosecutor.

But something else must happen first, before the Court can act. Either a State Party refers a "situation" to the Prosecutor; the Security Council refers a "situation" to the Prosecutor; or the Prosecutor initiates an investigation on his own authority, as set out in the Statute.

6. Territorial Jurisdiction

where the person accused of committing a crime is a national of a state party (or where the person's state has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court);

where the alleged crime was committed on the territory of a state party (or where the state on whose territory the crime was committed has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court); or

where a situation is referred to the Court by the UN Security Council.

7. Temporal Jurisdiction

Court's jurisdiction does not apply retroactively: it can only prosecute crimes committed on or after 1 July 2002 (the date on which the Rome Statute entered into force). Where a state becomes party to the Rome Statute after that date, the Court can exercise jurisdiction automatically with respect to crimes committed after the statute enters into force for that state.

8. The Court is intended as a court of last resort, investigating and prosecuting only where national courts have failed.

A case is inadmissible if:
‘(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;

(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;

(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3;

(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.’

9. If a person has already been tried by another court, the ICC cannot try them again for the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:

‘(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or

(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.’ ( Sec.3, Art. 20 of Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

10. The official seat of the Court is in The Hague, Netherlands, but its proceedings may take place anywhere. The ICC is sometimes referred to as a "World Court" but it should not be confused with the International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, which is the United Nations organ that settles disputes between nations.

11. ICC currently has twelve detention cells in a Dutch prison in Scheveningen, The Hague.

Structure

The Court consists of four organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry.

12. Presidency
The Presidency is responsible for the proper administration of the Court (apart from the Office of the Prosecutor). It comprises the President and the First and Second Vice-Presidents — three judges of the Court who are elected to the Presidency by their fellow judges for a maximum of two three-year terms. As of October 2007, the President is Philippe Kirsch, who was elected to a second term on 11 March 2006.

13. Judicial Divisions
The Judicial Divisions consist of the 18 judges of the Court, organized into three divisions — the Pre-Trial Division, Trial Division and Appeals Division — which carry out the judicial functions of the Court.

The Pre-Trial Division (which comprises the First Vice President and six other judges) confirms indictments and issues international arrest warrants. T

The Trial Division (the Second Vice President and five other judges) presides over trials.

Decisions of the Pre-Trial and Trial Divisions may be appealed to the Appeals Division (the President and four other judges). Judges are assigned to divisions according to their qualifications and experience.

Judges are elected to the Court by the Assembly of States Parties. They serve nine-year terms and are not generally eligible for re-election. All judges must be nationals of states parties to the Rome Statute, and no two judges may be nationals of the same state. They must be “persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices”.

14. Office of the Prosecutor
Responsible for conducting investigations and prosecutions. It is headed by the Prosecutor, who is assisted by two Deputy Prosecutors. The Rome Statute provides that the Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently; as such, no member of the Office may seek or act on instructions from any external source, such as states, international organisations, non-governmental organisations or individuals.

The Prosecutor may open an investigation under three circumstances:

when a situation is referred to him by a state party;

when a situation is referred to him by the United Nations Security Council, acting to address a threat to international peace and security; or

when the Pre-Trial Chamber authorises him to open an investigation on the basis of information received from other sources, such as individuals or non-governmental organisations.

As of October 2007, the Prosecutor is Luis Moreno-Ocampo of Argentina, who was elected by the Assembly of States Parties on 21 April 2003 for a term of nine years.

15. Registry
Responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court. This includes, among other things, “the administration of legal aid matters, court management, victims and witnesses matters, defence counsel, detention unit, and the traditional services provided by administrations in international organisations, such as finance, translation, building management, procurement and personnel”. The Registry is headed by the Registrar, who is elected by the judges to a five-year term.

Rights of the Accused

16. All persons are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

17. Rights of the accused and persons during investigations. Include the right to be fully informed of the charges against him or her; the right to have a lawyer appointed, free of charge; the right to a speedy trial; and the right to examine the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf.

18. In order to ensure “equality of arms” between defence and prosecution teams, the ICC has established an independent Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (OPCD) to provide logistical support, advice and information to defendants and their counsel. The OPCD also helps to safeguard the rights of the accused during the initial stages of an investigation.

19. ICC is legally and functionally independent from the United Nations.

Nonetheless, the Rome Statute grants the UN a clear role in relation to the Court. The Security Council may refer to the Court situations that would not otherwise fall under the Court's jurisdiction (as it did in relation to the situation in Darfur, which the Court could not otherwise have prosecuted as Sudan is not a state party). Article 16 of the Rome Statute also allows the Security Council to require the Court to defer from investigating a case for a period of 12 months. Such a deferral may be renewed indefinitely by the Security Council.

20. It is unclear to what extent the Court is compatible with reconciliation processes that grant amnesty to human rights abusers as part of agreements to end conflict. Article 16 of the Rome Statute allows the Security Council to prevent the Court from investigating or prosecuting a case, and Article 53 allows the Prosecutor the discretion not to initiate an investigation if he or she believes that “an investigation would not serve the interests of justice”.

International Criminal Court

http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm

http://www.answers.com/topic/international-criminal-court

http://www.un.org/News/facts/iccfact.htm

CASE DIGEST

ICMC vs. Calleja
GR 85750, Sept. 28, 1990




FACTS:


As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's communist rule confronted the international community.

In response to this crisis, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan.

ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines.

Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.

Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), reversed the Med-Arbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. At that time, ICMC's request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEFORAF).

Subsequently, DEFORAF, granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC.

ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election sustaining the affirmative of the proposition citing:

(1) its Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine Government giving it the status of a specialized agency, (infra);

(2) the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 91 on 17 May 1949 (the Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed by the President on 30 August 1949 and deposited with the UN on 20 March 1950) infra; and

(3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.



ISSUE:

• Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.

HELD:

The foregoing issue constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly necessitated by its international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.

ICMC's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, Article III, Section 8, and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the 1987 Constitution.

For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.

The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation is neither remote and from which international organizations are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of their functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization concerned, its property and its assets. It is equally applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem."

CASE DIGEST

MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS

GR 88211, Sept. 15, 1989

FACTS:
February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx x
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

Furthermore, they contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:

Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

• Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD:

SC well-considered opinion that the President has a residual power which justifies her act of banning the return of the Marcoses and she did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.